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Abstract
This paper analyzes the potential impacts of the Doha trade proposals (those of the USA, EU and G20)
on agricultural production and incomes of China’s farmers by region and income group. By linking a global
trade model to a national policy model which itself is connected to a set of disaggregated household data, we
are able to assess the effects of the proposed Doha trade liberalizations on households both at the national
and regional levels. According to the results of the model, the impacts of a Doha Round agreement on
households differ significantly from those of China’s WTO accession. China’s economy would benefit from
the trade liberalization associated with the Doha Round. The overall impacts, however, are relatively minor.
Although farmers will benefit at the national level, the gains among farmers vary largely by income group
and province. Also, the impacts on households that produce different types of crops differ.
© 2010 Society for Policy Modeling. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
It is well known that over the past several decades that China has experienced remarkable eco-
nomic growth and impressive poverty reduction. The annual growth rate of gross domestic product
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(GDP) reached 9.8% between 1979 and 2006 (NBSC, 2007a,b). The incidence of rural poverty
(based on China’s official poverty line) fell from 31% in 1978 to 2.3% in 2006 (NBSC, 2007).
Despite this remarkable record, China continues to confront great challenges in its development,
including addressing concerns about those that remain in poverty.
While there are a number of potential drivers of these adverse economic trends, many have
pointed to trade liberalization as one of the main reasons (Huang, Xu, Li, & Rozelle, 2005; Huang,
Zhang, & Rozelle, 2007; Mao & Liu, 2005; Wang, 2002). Agriculture was at the center of debate
over China’s entry into the WTO. There was great concern inside China that its rural economy
was highly vulnerable to trade reforms. Despite the sensitivities inside China, because of the
importance of agriculture in the political economies of a number of the developed nations with
whom China negotiated its accession to the WTO, there were high demands made of China’s trade
policy makers. Even now nine years after China’s accession to the WTO, despite the conclusions
of several studies that have shown that the effect of WTO accessions on China’s agriculture (in
general) has been modest (Anderson, Huang, & Ianchovichina, 2004; Huang, Li, & Rozelle,
2003; Huang, Rozelle, & Chang, 2004), there is still concern about the impacts that additional
trade liberalization—such as, the new round of the Doha negotiations—might have on China’s
agricultural production and rural poverty.
A careful analysis of the trade impacts on poverty is particularly needed in the light of the
ongoing Doha negotiations. Based on our knowledge, there is no study in China that analyzes the
impacts of the recent proposals by the USA, the EU and the G20 on China’s agriculture and rural
poverty. More generally, there is also little if any work that has attempted to assess the effect of
trade policy changes on specific agricultural commodities on a disaggregated regional level (i.e.,
the province level). Without this type of analysis, it is difficult to generate convincing results that
can be used to measure the effect of proposed trade liberalization moves on households and to
develop policies to try to offset the adverse effects.
The overall goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of how further trade liberalization
will affect China’s agricultural development. More specifically, in this paper we seek to examine
the impacts of Doha Round negotiations on the production, prices and incomes of farmers, and
particularly the income of the poor, in different regions of China. These results can then be used
as a basis for designing policies to help offset the negative effects—especially those on the poor.
2. China’s agricultural trade and Doha round negotiations
The structure of China’s trade, in general, and agricultural trade, in particular, has changed
dramatically over the past two decades. While the seven-fold increase in exports of food products
during the period would be regarded as extraordinary in almost any other economy, it pales
into insignificance relative to the 34-fold increase in non-agricultural exports. During this same
time period, agricultural imports grew by a factor of 11—although the rate of rise varied among
commodities. Imports of oilseeds grew by a factor of 96; fruits and vegetables by a factor of
84; and fish by a factor of 70, all from low initial levels. By contrast, imports of grains grew
by a factor of two, far below the growth rate of exports. Imports of agricultural fibers, mainly
cotton, grew by a factor of 6, also below the growth rate of overall agricultural exports, although
these imports grew substantially after China’s WTO accession. Interestingly, despite the relatively
higher in total exports compared to total imports during the past 30 years, net agricultural trade
has gradually changed from surplus to deficit over the past decade. However, the trade deficit in
agriculture is still small: by 2005 the volume of agricultural net trade deficit was only 0.4% of
China’s total exports.
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Regardless of China’s net trade position, since its accession to the WTO, the agricultural trade
regime has become relatively open. For key products, such as rice, wheat and maize, the assessed
tariffs have been low because the in-quota tariff rates have generally been the ones that have
applied (see Huang, Yang, Li, Rozelle, and Martin (2009), Appendix Table 1, for a complete
listing of these rates). For many other products, such as fish products, oilseeds, pork, poultry,
sugar and dairy products, protection rates are relatively low and higher out-of-quota rates are not
applicable.
The fact that China’s agricultural tariff rates are relatively low is important for the decisions
of leaders who are trying to decide whether to go along with. The potential to secure large
market access gains is especially important economically for countries like China, whose own
agricultural trade barriers are relatively low, but which face relatively high barriers in export
markets. Huang et al. (2009) showed that while China’s agricultural import tariffs are in some
cases above world average tariff rates, in most cases they are below them. However, at the same
time (and importantly for this paper) the tariffs on exports from China (that is, the rates imposed
on China’s food exporters) are above the world average rates. When taken together, in fact, the
data show a pattern of tariffs (in many cases) being higher on exports from China than on the rest
of the world’s exports. This pattern of distortions may mean that China can best address this set
of systematic inequalities through negotiations under the WTO.
2.1. Main proposals in the Doha round negotiations
Despite the heavy burden imposed on countries like China by other countries’ barriers, the WTO
negotiations under the Doha agenda will not reduce agricultural protection to zero. Rather, what
is envisaged is reduction in tariff rates using a so-called tiered-formula approach that makes larger
cuts in higher tariffs. The specific approach to be used has been the subject of great disagreement,
with a wide range of proposals advanced as the negotiations have continued. One relatively early
point of agreement, however, was that the all proposals for negotiation would use four “tiers.” For
the industrial countries, some of the key proposals have included those offered by the USA and
the EU. The proposal that is supposed to reflect more of the developing countries point of view
is the one developed by the G-20. Building on the G-20 proposal, Falconer (2007) subsequently
suggested a range of possibilities for cuts in each tier. Each of these proposals is set out in Table 1.
As is evident from Table 1, the US proposal was by far the most ambitious, with a ceiling
tariff after cutting of 75%, and cuts of 90% in tariffs above 60%. The G-20 proposal, which has
been the basis for most of the discussion in recent years, involved a tariff cap of 100%, and cuts
of 75% in tariffs above 75%. The most recent proposal, by Crawford Falconer, the chairman
of the agricultural negotiations, removes the explicit cap on tariffs, and lowers the cuts in the
highest tariffs, while raising the cuts in the lowest tariffs. Since the G-20 proposal captures the
broad nature of the policy changes involved in the subsequent proposal, and because the Falconer
proposal provides only ranges (and these ranges seem likely to change in the future), we focus
primarily on the G-20 proposal in our analysis.
As is clear from Table 1, the proposed tiers for developing countries are wider than those for
the industrial countries. This means that in the case of developing countries, the stiffest tariff
cuts do not apply except for the higher rates of tariffs (when compared to the case of industrial
countries). For example, under the G-20 formula, the largest cuts are in tariffs above 130% for
developing countries, rather than those above 75% for the industrialized countries. In addition,
the largest cuts only reach 40% for these tariffs (in the case of developing countries), rather than
75% as in the case of industrialized countries. The Falconer proposal also eliminates the tariff
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Table 1
Proposed tariff reductions of agricultural commodities (%).
EU proposal G20 proposal US proposal Falconer
Tiers Cut Tiers Cut Tiers Cut Tiers Cut
For industrial countries
1 <30 35 <20 45 0 < 20 65 < 20 48–52
2 30–60 45 20–50 55 20–40 75 20–50 55–60
3 60–90 50 50–70 65 40–60 85 50–75 62–65
4 >90 60 >70 75 >60 90 >75 66–73
Cap 100 100 75 No Cap
For developing countries
1 <20 37–43 <30 25 <30 25(1–40) <30 32–34.6
2 20–40 43–50 30–80 30 30–80 30 30–80 36.6–40
3 40–60 50–57 80–130 35 80–130 35 80–130 41.3–43.3
4 >60 57–60 >130 40 >130 40 >130 44–48.6
Cap 112 150 150 No Cap
Source: Hanrahan and Schnepf (2005), Sharma (2007) and Falconer (2007).
cap. For developing countries, it raises the tariff cuts on both the lowest and the highest tariffs
relative to the G-20 formula.
Since these tariff formulas are to be applied to bound, rather than applied tariffs, their ultimate
effect on applied rates will depend upon the gap between bound and applied tariff rates. It will
also depend upon the extent to which some countries are excluded from the formula cuts, and
particular products are selected for more flexible treatment than is allowed under the formula. In
this stage of our analysis, we focus on the impacts of formula cuts to provide a benchmark against
which these questions of flexible treatment can be addressed in future research. Besides the market
accession negotiations, export competition and domestic support are other two important aspects
in the Doha trade negotiations. These will also be considered in the modeling.
3. Methodology and scenarios
To understand the impacts of different proposals for trade liberalization in the Doha Round
WTO negotiations, we use two models, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) and the Chinese
Agricultural Policy Simulation and Projection Model (CAPSiM). The national-level economic
impacts of Doha are assessed with the GTAP model. The simulated price changes of interna-
tional agricultural products are then fed into CAPSiM in order to analyze the impacts of a Doha
agreement on China’s agricultural production. A module embedded in CAPSiM then allows us
to study the effects of trade policy changes on the incomes of farmers by region and by income
group.
While a more complete description of the model can be found in Huang et al. (2009), in
briefest terms our international trade model uses GTAP, a well known multi-country, multi-sector
computable general equilibrium model which is often used for international agricultural trade
analysis (Hertel, 1997). We cannot, however, rely solely on GTAP since China enters the analysis
as a single region. In order to meet our goals of tracking the effects of trade liberalization to
households (and on different regions of the country), we also have to be able to model the effect
of trade policy changes on China’s agricultural economy. To do this, we adopt CAPSiM, a model
differs from GTAP in several ways. First, CAPSiM is a partial equilibrium model. Most of the
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elasticities used in CAPSiM are estimated econometrically by ourselves using state-of-the-art
econometrics and with assumptions that make our estimated parameters consistent with theory.
Both the demand and supply elasticities change over time since income elasticities depend on
the level of income. In addition, cross-price elasticities of demand (supply) depend on the food
budget shares. In CAPSiM, the crops are also more disaggregated. CAPSiM can analyze 19 crops
and livestock and fishery commodities, including all of the main cereals (rice, wheat, maize and
soybean), sweet potato, potato, soybean, other edible oil crops, cotton, vegetables, fruit, other
crops, six livestock products, and one aggregate fishery sector. The 19 commodities account for
more than 90% of China’s agricultural output. Finally, recent versions of CAPSiM are designed to
track changes in policies, including trade liberalization, on both national and regional (provincial)
aggregates and households.1 The description of the actual way that GTAP and CAPSiM are linked
can be found in Huang et al. (2009).
3.1. Policy scenarios
In this study, four scenarios are considered in assessing the impacts of Doha on China’s agri-
culture at the national, regional and household levels. The four scenarios include one baseline
scenario and 3 alternative Doha policy scenarios. The Doha policy scenarios include USA pro-
posal, the EU proposal and the G20 proposal. In the analysis we are going to assume that all of
the parts of the Doha agreement are realized by 2015. As such, we estimate the impact of Doha
by comparing the baseline results with those under Doha policy scenarios in 2015.
3.1.1. Baseline scenario
In the baseline scenario, there are several key assumptions. First, we assume that there is no
Doha agreement. Instead, every country will continue operating under their existing policies. If
there are major trade agreements that affect agriculture, they are not due to the Doha Round.
Therefore, our scenario embodies the effects of important known policies related to international
trade, such as the continued implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments, China’s WTO
accession promises (which continue to take effect through 2010), the phase-out the Multi-fiber
Agreement (MFA—by January 2005) and the implementation of the Agreement of Free Trade
Areas between China and ASEAN member countries.
3.1.2. Doha policy scenarios
Doha negotiations mainly focus on three so-called pillars (i.e., market access; export com-
petition or subsidies; and domestic support). Although there is a consensus that it will include
elimination of export subsidies, the proposed reductions in import tariff and domestic support vary
significantly between the EU, G20 and USA proposals. The major proposed policy commitments
that are parts of the EU, G20 and USA proposals are summarized in Table 1. In short, the policy
shifts described in the table constitute the major inputs into the scenario formulations.
1 In order to estimate the impact of national changes in price, supply and demand on households, CAPSiM’s equilibrium
solutions, including estimated levels of supply, demand and the level of food prices, are simulated at the national level
given international prices. Domestic prices at the national level are transmitted to each region (province) and to the various
households within each region. Given the prices transmitted to the local level, each group of households within each region
change their production and consumption of each commodity based on the production and consumption elasticities which
also differ among regions and household groups. The impacts of trade liberalization on agricultural income for each group
of farmers are estimated given the changes in the household production and local prices as well as input changes.
Author's personal copy
Journal Identification = JPO Article Identification = 5870 Date: April 18, 2011 Time: 10:37 am
444 J. Yang et al. / Journal of Policy Modeling 33 (2011) 439–452
Table 2
The macro-impacts on China under EU, G20 and USA proposals in 2015.
EU proposal G20 proposal USA proposal
EV (million USD) 3479 3361 3413
Real GDP growth (%) 0.05 0.05 0.05
GDP price index (%) 0.99 0.98 0.97
Total income (%) 1.08 1.07 1.06
Term of trade (%) 0.46 0.43 0.44
Total export (%) 3.89 3.92 4.01
Total import (%) 5.56 5.60 5.70
Trade balance (million USD) 2293 2286 2492
Agricultural income (%) 2.04 2.05 2.24
Agricultural export (%) 10.31 10.99 19.89
Agricultural import (%) 6.83 7.41 9.08
Source: GTAP simulation results.
In the process of modeling the proposed provisions, there are two key modeling issues that
need to be addressed when one seeks to embed the proposals into the GTAP model. The first is
what kind of import tariff lines (applied tariffs or bound tariffs) is used for calculating the tariff
reduction. Although the gap between bound tariffs and current applied tariffs can be significant
in the case of some countries (Laborde, 2007), as only the applied tariffs are available in GTAP
database, the tariff cuts in our research are based on the applied tariffs.2
The second issue that we must address is what cuts in domestic support we should include
in the reduction formulas. Specifically, we need to make assumptions of the level of amber box
support in order to be able to make the cuts that are demanded by the different proposals. In order
to make our analysis consistent with other careful trade analyses, the categories of Amber Box
support and the subsidies in GTAP used in this study follow those used by Rae and Strutt (2003).
4. Potential impacts of the Doha round negotiations
Table 2 summarizes the impacts of the three policy scenarios on China’s overall economy.
The most interesting result is that regardless of which of the three scenarios that is simulated,
a Doha agreement would improve China’s economic welfare and stimulate domestic economic
growth though the impacts would not be large. According to our analysis, if any of these three
agreements were implemented, China’s welfare would increase by about 3.4 billion US$. Real
gross domestic production would rise by 0.05% when comparing the results of the scenario
analyses to the baseline. At the same time, international trade would also expand, including both
imports and exports. Since the export price rises higher than the import price, China’s terms of
trade would improve and China’s imports will grow faster than its exports. Although China’s
imports grow faster than its exports, China’s trade balance will still increase by about 2.3 billion.
While the overall impacts are minor, individuals associated with China’s agricultural sectors
would benefit from the adoption and extension of the proposed trade liberalization changes being
discussed under the Doha negotiations. As shown in Table 2, the rise in income in agriculture is
2 The gap between bound import tariff and current applied import tariff is usually called “binding overhang.” Using
applied tariffs, however, implies that the estimated impacts that are simulated in this study should be considered as upper
bounds.
Author's personal copy
Journal Identification = JPO Article Identification = 5870 Date: April 18, 2011 Time: 10:37 am
J. Yang et al. / Journal of Policy Modeling 33 (2011) 439–452 445
about two times that of the national average. Similarly, the increases of agricultural exports and
imports are also larger than those of the national average. Moreover, the growth of agricultural
exports is higher than that of imports. This relatively higher rate of rise in exports implies that the
agricultural sector as a whole will enjoy more trade benefits from Doha trade liberalization.
4.1. The impact on China’s international prices, trade and domestic production
Compared to the overall economic impacts, Doha Round liberalization would have larger
impacts on the international prices faced by China and international trade of agricultural commodi-
ties. Importantly, however, the trade and price impacts will vary significantly among commodities.
Whether a sector will enjoy higher prices from greater access to global markets (or whether it will
encounter more competition from the inflow of imports from the rest of world) largely depends on
pre-Doha policy arrangements, trade status, domestic support policies and the post-liberalization
reallocation of resources among domestic sectors. Our results also show that the impacts of
Doha multilateral trade liberalization on China are quite different from the effects of unilateral
liberalization of China’s WTO accession.
Compared to the results under the baseline, if the Doha round were to take effect, China’s
imports of grains and soybean will fall, while its exports will increase and China will gain in
net export of these crops in Doha Round.3 The nature of impacts is the result of how China’s
trade responds to the changes in the international prices of these commodities due to trade policy
changes. For the three scenarios simulated, compared to the baseline in 2015, our results show
that the Doha Round will raise China’s import price of grain by about 2% for rice, 3–4% for
wheat, about 6% for maize and other coarse grains, and 1–2% for soybean. Rising import prices
will lead to corresponding declines in the imports of these commodities. The largest declines in
imports, about 25–27%, will occur in the case of wheat and maize. On the other hand, all export
prices of grain and soybean will rise. The rise in these export prices will range from 6–7% for
wheat, to 12–17% for rice, and to 15–19% for soybean. With the negative impacts on imports and
positive impacts on exports of grain and soybean, China’s trade balance (or net exports) of these
commodities would rise by about 500 thousand tons for rice, more than 400 thousand tons for
wheat and about 500–700 thousand tons for soybean and maize. The Doha development agenda
tends to improve China’s food security.
The projected changes in grain and soybean prices are not surprising given the current produc-
tion and trade policies as well as policy reforms in the future. Grain sector is heavily protected
and supported by many developed countries. The world average of applied import tariffs on rice,
wheat and coarse grains are 8.7%, 4.3% and 8.2%, respectively, the highest among all commodi-
ties except sugar. While the protection of soybean in the rest of world is relatively less than grain,
its protection is also high. However, China’s import tariffs on grain and soybean has become
very small after its WTO accession. Moreover, China has never applied its above quota tariff on
imported grains. On soybean, the single tariff rate (3%) policy has been implemented since the
early 2000s. As a consequence, the tariff cut on imports of these commodities will be limited for
China. Moreover, China’s export of rice and maize still face the high tariff rates in place in other
countries. Therefore, Doha multilateral trade liberalization implies that the ratio of international
to domestic prices of grains and soybean will increase, which will facilitate China’s exports and
lower China’s imports.
3 Due to space restriction we do not provide the full results in table form for the impacts on trade flows and prices. For
more detail, see Huang et al. (2009).
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In contrast, the situations will be different for the cases of sugar and cotton. Moreover, the
findings also differ between these two commodities. Although China’s agriculture has been largely
liberalized, sugar is still relatively heavily protected by the nation’s border policies. The average
import tariff on sugar in 2006 was about 12.7%, which is higher than the worlds’ average tariff,
9.3%. Although Doha trade liberalization will raise the world price of sugar, China’s sugar import
price is expected to fall by 2.9–5.7% (under the different scenarios). This fall will occur because
the tariff reduction in China is scheduled to be more than the increase in the world price of
sugar. Consequently, compared with the baseline in 2015, China’s imports of sugar will rise by
about 15–20%. Although China’s export of sugar will also increase, exports will be minimal and
China’s net import will increase by about 400–500 thousand tons because of much higher volume
of imports in the baseline scenario.
Both the import and export of vegetables and fruit will expand in China, however, the positive
impact on China’s horticulture exports under the Doha Round will be more than its impacts
on import’s increase; this shift, of course, means that China’s trade surplus in the vegetable
and fruit sub-sectors will rise. China has a strong comparative advantage in the production of
horticulture since this is one of China’s more labor-intensive cropping sub-sector. Moreover,
China’s vegetables and fruit have great potential to expand if the Doha Round (or future rounds of
trade liberalization) talks can reduce the high import tariffs levied by other countries on China’s
horticultural exports.
The impacts of the Doha Round on the domestic production inside China are fully consistent
with the impacts of the Doha Round on trade in a number of ways. First, the production of
many grains (e.g., rice, wheat, maize, potato and other coarse grains) will increase. Second,
while the results for grain may not be surprising (due to the high levels of liberalization during
the WTO accession negotiations), our results suggest that the production of other land-intensive
commodities, such as soybean, oil crops and cotton, will also increase. In fact, the growth rates of
soybean and cotton are the highest among all the crops. The production of soybeans will increase
by 1.9%, 2.0% and 1.8% respectively in the EU, G20 and US proposals (Table 3). At the same
time, the output of cotton will rise by about 1.7% in all three proposals (Table 3). Third, one
of the most consistent results is that horticultural farmers should gain from trade liberalization.
According to our model, the output of labor-intensive vegetables and fruit will increase. This is
especially true in the more liberal US proposal. In fact, this is mostly true since the tariffs of
vegetables and fruit decrease sharply in US proposal, if that proposal were to be realized, China
would be able to further exploit its comparative advantage in labor-intensive vegetables and fruit.
Finally (and importantly), our results indicate China’s production of many animal products (i.e.,
beef, mutton, pork, poultry and eggs) will fall under the Doha trade scenarios.
4.2. The impacts on farmer income and poverty in China and its regions
Our results reveal that Doha trade liberalization has effects beyond supply, demand and trade
(and prices and national food security); additional trade reform will also help, in general, China’s
farmers increase their income. The contribution to income growth, however, according to the
findings, will be limited. As shown in Table 4, the per capita income of farmers, on average (for
the nation), will rise by 1.07% (or about 22 yuan), 1.12% (about 23 yuan) and 1.17% (about 24
yuan), respectively, in the EU, G20 and US proposals. The results also indicate that the gains of
farmers will increase under the more liberalized proposals.
Perhaps the more important result of this paper—given our interest in designing policies to
help China maximize the benefits and minimize the cost of trade reform—is that, while the gains
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Table 3
The impacts on production in China under different scenarios in 2015.
Baseline
(thousand ton)
Impacts under difference scenarios
EU proposal G20 proposal USA proposal
(Thousand ton) % (Thousand ton) % (Thousand ton) %
Milled rice 123,130 82 0.07 149 0.12 248 0.20
Wheat 98,643 79 0.08 88 0.09 84 0.09
Maize 181,251 88 0.05 32 0.02 −54 −0.03
Sweet potato 22,596 −48 −0.21 −53 −0.23 −58 −0.26
Potato 19,084 44 0.23 46 0.24 53 0.28
Other grain 15,735 248 1.58 248 1.58 228 1.45
Soybean 20,396 382 1.87 408 2.00 366 1.79
Cotton 9144 153 1.67 156 1.71 155 1.70
Oil crop 9658 26 0.27 36 0.37 20 0.21
Sugar crop 11,909 −289 −2.43 −318 −2.67 −370 −3.11
Vegetable 464,688 128 0.03 384 0.08 1490 0.32
Fruit 153,826 86 0.06 172 0.11 569 0.37
Pork 58,465 −204 −0.35 −220 −0.38 −240 −0.41
Beef 5905 −82 −1.39 −85 −1.44 −90 −1.52
Mutton 3481 −40 −1.15 −41 −1.18 −45 −1.29
Poultry 19,292 −30 −0.16 −42 −0.22 −55 −0.29
Egg 23,707 −88 −0.37 −90 −0.38 −93 −0.39
Milk 45,709 51 0.11 25 0.05 5 0.01
Fish 33,815 65 0.19 69 0.20 66 0.20
Source: CAPSiM simulation results.
are positive (albeit small), on average, they vary by income groups, topography and by minority
status. Although per capita incomes in all income groups will be improved, the benefits increase
gradually from the lowest to the highest income groups. As the shown in Table 4, the per capita
income of those farmers under poverty will increase by 1.00% (or 8.3 yuan), 1.06% (8.7 yuan)
Table 4
The impacts on per capita agricultural income in rural area by income groups under EU, G20 and USA proposals in 2015.
Absolute change (yuan) Relative change (%)
EU proposal G20 proposal USA proposal EU proposal G20 proposal USA proposal
National average 22.06 23.05 24.02 1.07 1.12 1.17
Under poverty 8.29 8.72 9.21 1.00 1.06 1.11
Income group 1 15.41 16.06 17.19 1.11 1.16 1.24
Income group 2 23.45 24.19 25.47 1.28 1.32 1.39
Income group 3 38.45 39.76 41.30 1.62 1.68 1.74
Income group 4 54.15 55.73 56.51 1.77 1.82 1.85
Income group 5 69.55 71.38 71.62 1.64 1.68 1.68
Farmers: Han 22.30 23.32 24.37 1.08 1.13 1.18
Farmers: Minority 8.40 7.48 3.71 0.44 0.39 0.20
Source: CAPSiM simulation results.
Note: The group under poverty includes all households with per capita income of less than 872 yuan in 2001, which
accounted for about 10% of rural population. Per capita income of groups 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were in the ranges of 872–1300,
1300–1700, 1700–2300, 2300–3300 and above 3300 yuan, respectively. The groups 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 accounted for about
15%, 15%, 20%, 20% and 20% of rural population in 2001.
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and 1.11% (9.2 yuan) in the EU, G20 and US proposals (row 2). Correspondingly, the increase
in per capita agricultural income of those farmers in the top income group (i.e., income group 5)
will rise by 1.64% (or 69.6 yuan), 1.68% (71.4 yuan) and 1.68% (71.6 yuan). This rate is higher
than that of the group farmers that earn incomes under the poverty line. In this way, we cannot
say the trade liberalization is progressive.
Interestingly, our results also allow us to show that ethnicity matters. The per capita income
of Han farmers is shown to rise more than that of those that live in minority villages. The average
per capita income of Han farmers will rise by 1.08% (22.3 yuan), 1.13% (23.2 yuan) and 1.18%
(24.4 yuan) in the EU, G20 and USA proposal. Correspondingly, the income growth of minority
farmers is much lower.
One of the most important parts of our analysis is our investigation into the sources of different
gains (losses) among groups. Among all of the differences, the most important is the differ-
ences among the groups in terms of their farming structure. In other words, richer Han farmers
living in plains village benefit more because of the nature of the crops that they are produc-
ing. In order to clearly show the difference in farming structure among the groups, we classify
agricultural commodities into three groups based on our analysis of production and trade. The
first group is composed by those commodities that are discovered by our analysis to produce
benefits for farmers. The set of goods include rice, wheat, soybean, cotton, oil crops, vegeta-
bles, fruit and fish. We call these beneﬁting commodities. The second group includes those that
when produced under the Doha round proposals will lead farmers to incur a loss (relative to
the baseline). These activities include sweet potato, sugar, beef, mutton, pork and poultry. We
call these non-beneﬁting commodities. The rest agricultural commodities are not affected signif-
icantly. These activities include maize, milk, potato and some minor crops (e.g., other grain).
We call these neutral commodities. Through the comparison of farming structures—benefiting
versus non-benefiting—we seek to explain the reason why different groups enjoy/suffer different
impacts.
The farming structures of different groups help explain the nature of their benefits. As shown
in column 1 of Table 5, the different income groups that gained the most from the Doha round also
produced more benefiting commodities. Specifically, farmers that were under the poverty line only
had 53% of their output from benefiting commodities. In contrast, those in the top decile had 67%
of their output in benefiting commodities. Although the share of the non-benefiting commodities
to total production was almost the same (there is a difference in products that are neutral), the
difference between the propensity of higher income groups to produce relatively more benefiting
commodities explains a great deal of our results among income groups.
Although we show that at the national level households in all income groupings gain from trade
liberalization, this result does not hold for every province (Table 6). At the national (aggregated)
level, the overall impact on farmer’s per capita income is small. The main reason is that there
are offsetting effects among provinces. But from Table 6 it can be seen that the impacts differ
significantly across provinces even for the farmers in the same income categories.
Because trade impacts are more commodity-specific, and because farmers in different income
groups in different provinces grow different sets of commodities, we can see that there actually
are much sharper regional and income class-specific impacts. It also means that such impacts
may have implications for equity. In the case of China, while nearly all farmers in all provinces,
except Guangxi and Yunnan, can be seen to benefit from trade reform, liberalization generally
hurts producers in Guangxi and Yunnan provinces. The reason, of course, is clear when we
consider that farmers in Guangxi and Yunnan provinces are primarily producing sugar, which is
the commodity most hurt by Doha trade liberalization.
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Table 5
Shares of output values for competitive and non-competitive agricultural products for different groups of farmers under
baseline in 2015.
Share of competitive
agricultural products (those
that benefited from Doha)
Share of non-competitive
agricultural products (those
that lost from Doha)
Share of neutral
agricultural products
(those that did not gain
nor lose from Doha)
(1) (2) (3)
National average 62 11 27
Under poverty 53 10 37
Income group 1 58 12 30
Income group 2 60 13 27
Income group 3 61 12 27
Income group 4 63 11 26
Income group 5 67 11 22
Farmers in plain area 61 8 31
Farmers in hill area 68 15 17
Farmers in mountain area 57 18 25
Farmers: Han 63 12 25
Farmers: Minority 46 24 30
Note: Based on the analysis of the impacts on trade and production, the potential benefit agricultural products under
column 1 include rice, wheat, soybean, cotton, oil crops, vegetables, fruits and fish; the potential lost products under
column 2 include sugar, beef, mutton, pork and poultry; the neutral products include maize, milk, potato and some minor
crops (e.g. other grains).
Interestingly, not all the poor will gain or lose in terms of production with trade liberalization.
Our analysis shows that the poor (and more significantly for richer farmers) in the poor provinces
(in the western and northern provinces) gain more from trade liberalization, while the poor in
the eastern and southern provinces gain relatively less or are hurt (Table 6). Therefore, according
to these results, Doha trade reform will contribute to poverty alleviation in some parts of China.
However, at the same time it may lead to greater poverty and worsening income distribution
problems in other regions.
It also is worthy to note that farmer incomes in some regions may become worse under the
more liberalized proposals. As shown in Table 6, farmer per capita incomes, on average (at the
national level), will increase under the more liberalized proposals. However, it is not always true
when looking at the differences among farmers in different provinces. Our results show that per
capita incomes in Guangxi and Yunnan fall gradually from 13.6 yuan and 3.1 yuan under the
EU proposal, to 16.6 yuan and 4.7yuan under the G20 proposal, to 24.5 and 8.4 under the US
proposal. Therefore, one implication of this finding is that the national government needs to put
effort into designing a way to compensate farmers that suffer relatively more pain (in certain types
of villages in certain provinces) than those in others (that gain).
5. Summary, policy discussion and concluding remarks
One of the main contributions of this research is our approach. In the paper we create a series
of linkages between a global general equilibrium trade model and our regional partial equilibrium
models to explore the possible effects of Doha trade negotiations on China’s agriculture. We also
link the domestic market effects to households, examining how farmer income in different regions
and income groups is affected by trade liberalization. Unfortunately, because we do not have the
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Table 6
Impacts on per capita agricultural income of different farmers by province under EU, G20 and USA proposals in 2015
(yuan/person).
Average farmers Farmers under poverty in 2001 The richest (top 20%) of
farmers in 2001
EU G20 USA EU G20 USA EU G20 USA
Beijing 17.9 19.7 25.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.8 30.6 29.4
Tianjin 22.4 22.9 25.4 3.4 3.3 2.8 74.4 70.9 60.0
Hebei 30.7 31.9 33.8 8.5 8.7 8.6 81.2 78.5 67.9
Shanxi 15.4 16.2 18.1 7.7 7.8 7.9 37.5 35.9 31.0
Inner Mongolia 27.8 27.9 19.5 11.6 11.4 9.3 172.5 166.2 152.7
Liaoning 36.6 37.4 38.3 12.4 12.4 12.1 198.3 193.0 169.6
Jilin 80.4 80.7 77.2 15.6 15.5 14.6 374.2 365.0 326.1
Heilongjiang 65.5 67.3 60.9 13.1 12.8 11.4 144.1 136.6 126.6
Shanghai 19.1 20.9 24.0 5.3 5.7 5.7 14.0 14.5 17.5
Jiangsu 32.0 34.2 35.9 10.0 10.5 11.2 35.7 34.9 33.0
Zhejiang 23.4 25.9 33.7 0.5 0.5 0.7 26.3 29.1 40.0
Anhui 28.9 30.9 30.7 14.1 14.8 14.6 41.0 39.7 37.1
Fujian 22.3 24.3 31.0 2.3 2.5 3.2 46.1 50.1 65.3
Jiangxi 23.8 25.6 27.8 10.0 10.7 12.0 45.8 48.7 57.9
Shangdong 37.1 38.7 41.0 25.7 26.1 25.7 86.1 84.2 75.8
Henan 39.4 41.1 40.7 16.9 17.5 17.8 80.8 77.6 67.3
Hubei 44.6 48.0 50.4 13.3 14.0 14.5 82.3 85.6 93.5
Hunan 21.9 23.6 27.0 8.5 9.3 11.3 18.0 18.1 21.1
Guangdong 21.4 22.5 25.4 4.8 5.0 5.1 43.8 46.9 58.3
Guangxi −13.6 −16.6 −24.5 −24.5 −26.7 −33.0 44.2 47.5 55.3
Hainan 22.8 24.6 28.9 9.3 9.9 11.4 45.2 49.3 68.0
Chongqing 20.0 21.5 26.1 9.3 10.0 12.3 48.6 47.9 45.8
Sichuan 17.4 18.6 22.1 8.9 9.4 11.1 45.3 45.0 44.4
Guizhou 12.0 12.5 13.6 6.5 6.5 6.9 76.1 74.4 67.5
Yunnan −3.1 −4.7 −8.4 −16.7 −17.7 −20.0 24.7 28.0 34.9
Tibei 38.5 38.5 33.9 32.9 32.9 29.5 34.7 30.0 18.6
Shaanxi 15.1 15.9 17.8 8.6 9.0 10.1 49.2 48.3 48.3
Gansu 36.0 36.8 36.4 11.4 11.7 11.4 199.1 200.2 188.5
Qinghai 9.4 9.5 6.4 12.1 13.2 13.2 −8.7 −10.9 −15.8
Ningxia 16.1 15.6 15.0 4.5 4.5 4.1 85.9 81.2 66.7
Xinjiang 74.9 75.8 70.6 48.3 49.4 47.5 224.1 234.9 254.2
Source: CAPSiM simulation results.
data to do so, the research does not account for the parts of the Doha proposals that are focused
on special and sensitive products.
In using this framework, the impacts of the Doha trade liberalization scenarios have been shown
to have a number of regular characteristics. First, the production of grains will increase. This means
that, ceteris paribus, under trade liberalization, self-sufficiency in grains actually will improve.
Second, the output of soybeans and cotton also will rise. In fact, although these are land-intensive
commodities, their growth rates are the highest among all the crops. Third, the projected fall in
China’s production of sugar under Doha Round compared with the production under baseline
scenario is the greatest challenge to China’s producers. Fourth, trade liberalization, as might be
expected, will promote China’s production of vegetables and fruit. This result is most obvious
in the US proposal. When other nations liberalize their horticultural sectors, China gains and it
is able to further exploit its comparative advantage in labor-intensive products. When examining
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the effects on farm household income and the income in the regions in which different sets of
households live and produce, it can be seen that the nation’s leaders should be aware that further
liberation will also have different effects on income and poverty. Those farmers producing crops
in which China’s production, prices and export will rise (or imports will fall) will benefit from
increased trade liberalization. The opposite will also be true. The main determinant of whether
production, prices and trade will move in a beneficial way is the relative levels of protection
between China and rest of the world prior to the proposed Doha trade liberalizations.
So what do these results mean for policy? Perhaps the most basic lesson from this paper is that
since China will benefit—in several ways—from further trade reform, its leaders may want to take
a more active role in pushing forward the Doha Round negotiations, reducing high tariffs imposed
on China’s products in the rest of world. Moreover, our findings have important implications not
only to China’s position in Doha negotiation, but also for its domestic grain security. Importantly,
China’s food security improves under the Doha proposals.
However, it is true, as also shown in the paper that not all farmers in all regions benefit. As a
consequence of these differential impact issues, policy makers might also want to consider several
actions. First, officials need to try to encourage farmers in poorer areas to shift their production
decisions (where appropriate) to more competitive and benefiting products that will gain from
Doha Round. Second, China may need to implement regional policy to facilitate crop production
structural change in major sugar production areas (sugarcane in South China and sugarbeet in
Xingjiang and Helongjing). Third, officials may also need to take other non-trade actions to
increase the livelihood of farmers in these areas. In many areas, farmers do not have an advantage
in any farming activity. In such areas rural education, better communications and other policies
that might facilitate their shift into the non-farm sector may be the most beneficial policy. Fourth,
there is a role for government for improving agricultural productivity through more research,
R&D extension and agricultural infrastructure investment, particularly in poor areas. Last, but not
least, there is also a role of government to make effort in compensate farmers that suffer relatively
more lose or less gains than those in others.
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